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This article describes how disrupting the activities of suspected violent
extremists has become an increasingly significant construct in the policy and
practice of the Prevent strand of UK Counter-Terrorism. Informed by empiri-
cal data collected during semi-structured interviews with police officers
involved in conducting disruptions and members of the communities where
these occurred, blended with a limited amount of field observation, the analy-
sis documents how and why a logic of disruption has assumed increasing
prominence in counter terrorism work. In respect of police interventions in
particular, implementing disruptions, rather than pursuing fully-fledged
prosecutions, represents a pragmatic way of reconciling increasing demand
with limited resources, as well as managing some of the difficulties of translat-
ing intelligence into legal evidence. Conceptualized in this way, the analysis
positions disruption as a distinctive mode of crime prevention; one premised
upon logics of near-event interdiction. As such, it is understood as rather dif-
ferent in its operations and functions to other forms of “early intervention”
that are increasingly prominent in much contemporary crime prevention pol-
icy. By focusing upon how specific Prevent interventions are implemented and
performed this analysis makes a particular contribution to our knowledge of
counter terrorism work. This reflects the fact that most previous studies of
Prevent and other countering violent extremism programs have provided
analyses of community perceptions and reactions to policing and the policy
frame, rather than the configuration of the interventions themselves.
On the evening of January 19, 2012, officers from the South
Wales Police and the Wales Extremism and Counter-Terrorism
Unit entered the Canton Community Centre in Cardiff with the
intent of disrupting a meeting being hosted by Al Ghurabaa. This
group, closely allied with the organization Muslims Against Cru-
sades that had been proscribed by the Home Secretary two
months previously as an affiliate of Al-Muhajiroun, had taken to
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holding private meetings in venues in the local area.1 Their pub-
lic and private activities were starting to generate considerable
concern among members of the local Muslim community.
In part this reflected several recent events, including the
arrest in December 2010 of five men from Cardiff for their part
in an alleged plot to blow up the London Stock Exchange, and a
second case where two local men had been traced to Kenya
where they were trying to join a terrorist group. Set against this
backdrop, the increasing public visibility of some of the key indi-
viduals involved with the Al Ghurabaa group and their seeming
ability to act with impunity were proving troubling. These com-
munity concerns had been relayed to the police at a senior level
through well established channels of engagement.
The police action was therefore designed to overtly disrupt
the group with the aim of sending a message both to those allied
to Al Ghurabaa and the wider community. The formal aims set
out in the police operational order were to:
 Engage in overt disruption;
 Dismantle the Al Ghurabaa infrastructure;
 Divert individuals from radicalization;
 Respond to legitimate public concern.
It was, according to the Association of Chief Police Officer’s
Prevent Delivery Unit, who have a national view of such issues
“. . .the first direct disruption of this kind to take place
nationally.”2
Operation Alton as the police intervention was labelled
sought to combine “Pursue” and “Prevent” activities. These are
strands of the United Kingdom’s overarching cross-governmental
CONTEST strategy. Pursue covers the traditional arena of
counter terrorism work in that it is focused upon identifying and
securing those known or suspected of engaging in terrorist activi-
ties (H.M. Government 2009). Prevent is more innovative and is,
as its name implies, concerned with stopping people from acquir-
ing the motivations to engage in violent activities. While the
meeting was in progress officers interrupted proceedings and
informed those present that the meeting was being stopped, and
that any further meetings were prohibited from taking place on
venues owned by Cardiff Council. One man was arrested at the
scene for attacking an officer and threatening to “cut your head
off and machine gun the lot of you.” Several others who were
known by police to be heavily involved in the group were given
1 For more detail on the background of this group see Wiktorowicz (2005) and Ken-
ney et al. (2016).
2 ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit Update, 22 September 2012 p. 4.
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letters advising them formally that they were of interest to the
police. Other attendees who, based upon intelligence, were not
identified as being what police label “subjects of interest,” were
offered a Counter Terrorism Prevent leaflet.
The police infrastructure was also mobilized to monitor
potential “displacement” activity. This second phase of operation-
al activity had several strands. It included Prevent activities with
individuals who, as a result of the meeting, were newly identified
as subjects of interest to the authorities. Further disruption mea-
sures were instigated against a number of Dawah stalls in the
Cardiff area, about which the local community had expressed
concerns. Visits were also performed by “Prevent Engagement
Officers”3 across the country to individuals who had been identi-
fied, on the basis of intelligence, as having an influence upon Al
Ghurabaa’s activity in Wales.
Subsequent to the operation, the police Prevent Engagement
Officers worked with 26 individuals who were judged suitable for
a Prevent intervention, a number of whom were assessed as
requiring long-term support. In the immediate aftermath of the
raid, police undertook a concerted communications campaign
involving meetings with all of the local Imams, reassurance uni-
formed patrols in the local neighborhoods, and media outputs.
The purpose being to explain and justify the intervention that
they had performed. This was because they anticipated that it
was likely to be publicly contested by those subject to it. Opera-
tion Alton was a relatively unremarkable counter terrorism oper-
ation. As the police Commander for Cardiff, who was directly
involved in the planning and design of what happened,
described, “It was a relatively straight forward 35 minute policing
operation.”
This short case study illuminates the workings of the kinds of
routine and mundane counter terrorism operation that are,
reflecting the current geo political climate, happening with
increasing regularity in towns and cities throughout the UK.
Political and public attention tends to be captured by high-profile
counter terrorism operations attempting to foil potentially spec-
tacular plots, or responding to attacks that have succeeded. How-
ever, the more modest logic of disruption underpins an
increasing number of counter terrorism interventions enacted
under the auspices of the UK government’s Prevent program.
The focus of this article is upon developing an account of
how these disruptions are enacted and performed as part of the
3 These are specialist counter terrorism police officers responsible for the delivery of
much of the police involvement in the Prevent strategy. Unlike other counter terrorism offi-
cers though they are fairly overt in their role, and public-facing.
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UK’s approach to countering terrorism. For while a number of
scholarly articles and books have assessed aspects of Prevent,
their principal focus has been with it as a policy construct and/or
community attitudes or perceptions toward it (e.g., Heath-Kelly
2013; Kundani 2009; Singh 2016). Much less work has attended
to Prevent as a set of practices, the ways in which it is being used
to engage with a particularly challenging contemporary social
problem, and “how” it is being delivered on the ground. Follow-
ing Howard Becker’s (2014) admonition of the social sciences to
start its expositions with fine-grained descriptions of how social
processes and organization happens, this is the focus herein. The
analysis seeks to move beyond official policy statements about
what should happen in respect of preventing violent extremism,
to describe how this aspect of counter terrorism work is actually
conducted. In so doing, the article also seeks to explicate the
influences that account for why disruption, conceptualized as a
mode of preventative behavior management, has become an
increasingly important component of UK counter terrorism
policy.
The data informing the analysis are derived from 41 semi-
structured interviews with police practitioners engaged in prevent
delivery and some limited field observations of their work,
together with 53 interviews with community members who had
engaged with Prevent interventions in some fashion. The latter
group in the sample were involved in co-producing disruptions
with the police, or had participated in informal social control dis-
ruptions, rather than being the subjects of such measures.4 One
constraint this imposes is that the analysis cannot assess the
extent to which disruption may have unintended consequences
such as, for example, acting as a radicalizing influence upon
those already on the edges of extremism. But what the empirical
materials do afford is detailed insight into the conduct of
disruptions.
The police respondents were typically police constables and
sergeants, with one or two more senior officers also interviewed
across each of the four forces from across England and Wales
participating in the study. In addition, two police interviewees
were senior officers seconded to the Home Office Prevent Deliv-
ery Unit. The community respondents were drawn from several
communities within these four police force areas. The majority of
interviewees were male and over 25, many of them having been
engaged with the police and Prevent in a range of capacities for
4 Readers interested in the experiences of those subject to disruption are directed
toward Sentas’ (2016) study based upon a small sample of Kurdish respondents living in
London who were the focus of interventions conducted by the Security Service.
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several years. All interviewees were assured their anonymity as a
condition of their involvement with the research.
Typically, interviews lasted about an hour, although some
were longer. The interview accounts were tape recorded and fully
transcribed. The interview schedules utilized for both police and
nonpolice respondents covered perceptions and attitudes toward
Prevent as a strategy, but accented local experiences of imple-
mentation. These interview data were augmented with observa-
tional material from fieldwork at meetings where a range of
Prevent related problems and issues were discussed, and a variety of
tactical and strategic interventions considered and reported on.
The next section of the article outlines Prevent and its policy
development, conceptually framed by ideas derived from the
general crime and violence prevention literature. This sets up a
more empirically led account of how Prevent is increasingly being
delivered through interventions premised upon logics of disrup-
tion. It is concluded that these are markers of a distinct
“disruptive turn” in the design and delivery of the preemptive
Prevent strand of UK counter terrorism policy.
“Prevent-ing” Problems
It is now over 10 years since four young men traveled from
Leeds in the North of England to explode bombs on the London
Underground and a bus, killing 52 people. Following on from
the attacks of 9/11 and since these events in London in July
2005, there has been a steady stream of stories of terrorist threats
and counter terrorist operations occurring in different towns and
cities across the UK and Europe, and attacks where further loss
of life has occurred.
The signature quality of terrorist violence is that it is
designed to function as a signal crime—an act that sends a mes-
sage to a public audience (Innes 2014). Although political rhetor-
ic typically contends “we will not accede to terrorist demands,”
with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the sequence of
attacks sketched in outline above have altered the stance and
positions of many key social institutions across Europe. These
processes of reaction have been afforded momentum by a
“legislative reflex”—whereby policy makers respond to each new
atrocity and innovation in terrorist methodology through intro-
ducing new legal instruments and “levers.”
In the aftermaths of recent terrorist attacks there have been
public remonstrations from senior figures within the security
agencies for governments to enhance their legal powers to tackle
a “morphing” and adapting threat. This siren call is potent for
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politicians who perceive they need to be seen to be “doing some-
thing,” and almost automatically reach for the formulation and
introduction of new laws as their principal response. Since 9/11
in the UK this legislative reflex has been manifested in: the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which allowed for deten-
tion without trial (later overturned by the courts); the Prevention
of Terrorism Act 2005, introducing the “control order” (also
overturned); the Terrorism Act 2006, that extended the deten-
tion of suspects without charge from 14 to 28 days; the Terrorism
Order 2006, enabling the Treasury to freeze the assets of sus-
pects; the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, under which police were
permitted to continue questioning suspects after charge; the Ter-
rorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010; and the 2015 Counter-Terrorism
and Security Bill. New legislation has become an almost ritualized
part of the societal response to major terrorist attacks.
These new legal instruments have had an important framing
influence upon the progressive development of and adjustments
to the cross-government CONTEST strategy, introduced to pro-
vide a comprehensive UK response to the changing international
terrorist threat post-2005 (Omand 2010). Subtly echoing
approaches originally implemented to manage volume crime
problems, it pivots around four key pillars: Prepare, Protect, Pre-
vent, and Pursue. The first two focus upon planning for potential
attacks and target hardening measures to mitigate their effects.
The “pursue” strand covers traditional counter terrorist activity
targeting known suspects (H.M Government 2009).
However, it is the more public-facing Prevent strategy that
has been most politically contentious, attracting considerable
opprobrium and criticism. This has included accusations that it
institutionalizes state-sanctioned domestic spying (Kundani 2009),
casting all Muslims as a “suspect community” (Pantazis & Pember-
ton 2009; Singh 2016). Several of the officers interviewed for the
current study were alert to such critiques and had sought to
respond by developing a more overt counter terrorism role in
their interactions with communities:
Because with Prevent there were rumours that we were spies,
but you can’t spy when you’re actually going up to somebody
and saying ‘Hi, I’m from the counter-terrorism unit.’ (Police
2659-12)
However, it was not clear from the empirical data generated
by this study how successful any such attempts were proving to
be in offsetting community concerns.
A key theme highlighted within more scholarly treatments of
Prevent is its pre-emptive orientations (Mythen et al. 2013;
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Walker & Mckay 2015). Ashworth and Zedner (2014) for
instance, cast Prevent as an inflection of a more general contem-
porary policy trend to criminalize conduct in anticipation of
harm being caused. Similarly, Heath-Kelly (2013) suggests that
Prevent is a particular manifestation of the prevalent risk gover-
nance discourse. Garland (2001) and Simon (2007) both docu-
ment how risk based logics have become a defining marker of
contemporary crime management strategies. Although similarly
positioned upstream of and in an anticipatory relationship to
defined kinds of risky behavior, the formal influence of more
general crime prevention theory and practices on Prevent’s policy
development has been more tacit than explicit. This notwith-
standing, there are several clear trace echoes of how the former
has influenced the latter that can be surfaced.
Prevent and Crime Prevention
Crime prevention as a broad set of activities and interventions
has been disaggregated through several conceptual frameworks.
In an early and influential treatment, ideas from public health
were imported to delineate primary, secondary, and tertiary
modes of crime prevention (Brantingham & Faust 1976). The
former was defined as involving modifying criminogenic condi-
tions in the physical and/or social environment. Contrasted with
which, “secondary crime prevention” focuses upon early identifi-
cation and intervention with individuals or groups exposed to
criminogenic circumstances. Tertiary crime prevention is the
most targeted configuration, inhibiting recidivism among those
who have previously offended.
These ideas were refined by van Dijk and de Waard’s (1991)
differentiation between preventative activities engaging with
offenders, situations, and victims. Tonry and Farrington (1995)
also separated out “social” from more “situational” tendencies in
crime prevention work, but they nuanced three specific “social”
strategies, namely: “developmental prevention”—inhibiting the
acquisition of criminal potential in individuals, “community pre-
vention”—influencing group and peer behaviors, often through
steering social norms, and “criminal justice prevention”—leverag-
ing formal social control capacities and capabilities.
Albeit in general crime prevention practice there is frequently
a greater overlap than implied by these conceptual reifications,
applied to the conduct of Prevent and CONTEST, it can be
observed that all of these modalities of preventative activity have
been utilized at one time or another. This reflects both how Pre-
vent is a multi-dimensional policy construct, but also one that has
been adapted as the perceived risks posed by violent extremist
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radicalization have shifted. For example, in recent years the
Channel Program has featured increasingly prominently in gov-
ernmental led discussions of Prevent, as the more explicit grass-
roots “community” base to most interventions that was prevalent
in the late-2000s has ceded ground (Lakhani 2012).
“Channel” as it is referred to by Prevent practitioners, is a
voluntary mentoring program for individuals judged to be at risk
of radicalization. In constructing these judgements, a multi-
agency group of staff from local agencies, utilize a structured risk
assessment matrix to determine who should be offered
“safeguarding” support. Channel’s multi-agency dimension,
which has become increasingly explicit in recent UK government
discourse around Prevent,5 clearly parallels the work of Commu-
nity Safety Partnerships and Public Service Boards that have
strived to institutionalize information sharing and decisionmaking
between relevant public service agencies involved in general
crime prevention (Crawford 1997).
There are affinities too with the role of “focused deterrence”
strategies in leveraging preventative effects upon violent crime.
Kennedy (2008) assembles a compelling argument that communi-
cative action is a critical component of successful prevention, inas-
much as it is signals about risks that shape the decisionmaking of
both potential offenders and victims. Consistent with this insight,
attention has been paid to how messages and narratives associat-
ed with countering radicalization risks should be communicated
to the public to best influence their behavior (Braddock & Hor-
gan 2015).
The efficacy of any preventative measure is predicated upon
an ability to know what risks and threats are presenting that
should be interdicted or interfered with through some
mechanism.
Consequently, how both offline and online surveillance is con-
ducted and intelligence derived from it are important consider-
ations for Prevent. There is considerable concern in the
contemporary academic literature about the prevalence and pro-
liferation of state surveillance, in particular, reflecting how new
platforms for electronic communication significantly extend the
capacity and capability of state agencies to monitor and “know”
about individuals’ thoughts and actions that would, in former
times, have probably remained private (Harcourt 2015). As Marx
(2016) describes it, there is a fear that such technologies afford
5 For instance, as part of the aforementioned 2015 legislation, the UK government
introduced a statutory “Prevent Duty” requiring specific public services to formally have
“due regard” for their roles and responsibilities to prevent people from being drawn into
terrorism.
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“windows into the soul,” providing opportunities for the direct
policing of thoughts and feelings—a matter of trepidation for
those holding “radical” or “extreme” views of many ideological
persuasions.
Surveillance is an intrinsic component of counter terrorism
work. Deploying human agents as covert intelligence sources has
been a long-standing feature of how liberal democratic polities
have sought to protect themselves from a range of perceived
threats (Marx 1988). Innes (2006) casts such measures as part of
the “dirty work” of defending democracy. Based upon extensive
ethnographic observation of officers involved in undercover
policing, Loftus et al. (2016) provide a number of new insights
into the moral and social organization of this work. They docu-
ment a range of external regulatory influences, interacting with
cultural norms and expectations, to shape operational decision-
making about which specific undercover tactics and strategies are
selected for use, when and against whom.
One effect of intensive and intrusive police surveillance docu-
mented by researchers working in some high crime communities
is the inducement of a profound “legal cynicism” among citizens,
that leads them to withdraw from active engagement with the
police, on the grounds that they fail to afford them adequate lev-
els of protection (Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2015; Kirk & Papach-
ristos 2011; Sampson & Bartusch 1998). The development of the
literature around legal cynicism is a correlate of a wider move-
ment concerned with police legitimacy (Sunshine & Tyler 2003;
Tyler & Fagan 2008).
Focusing specifically upon the police role in delivering Pre-
vent, there are important ethical questions about how far
“upstream” of actual risks of criminal activity and violence it is
legitimate for police to bring intrusive forms of human and digi-
tal surveillance. For while there is an understandable allure for
the police in seeking to engage “early interventions” that interdict
known risk factors for radicalization at a formative stage, any
such tendency needs to be tempered by a recognition that, as
McCord’s (2003) analysis concluded, some “cures” harm. Like-
wise, Grabosky (1996) reviewing “what works” in crime preven-
tion stresses that what proves effective in one situation, does not
necessarily translate to others.
Having reviewed several general crime prevention programs,
McCord identified how narrowly selected success criteria can
neglect the potential for wider and longer deleterious conse-
quences being induced. This is especially apposite for countering
violent extremism programs that are seeking to engage with com-
plex social problems, via multiple modes of intervention. It is a
warning that interventions conducted under the auspices of such
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programs may deliver some benefits, while concurrently generat-
ing other more negative consequences. Indeed, such a recogni-
tion may help to explain how and why police have come to
pragmatically position disruption so centrally in their Prevent
delivery mechanisms. For it is not a mode of preventative action
that intervenes very far upstream of any issue of concern.
Consistent with this analysis have been recurring concerns
about just how effective many Prevent interventions actually are.
For instance, analysis by the Royal United Services Institute of
police arrest statistics for 2014 reported that only 35 percent of
those arrested for terrorism-related offences were actually
charged (considerably lower than the charge rate of 58 percent
for all criminal offences). These figures were used by journalists
to draw negative inferences about the quality and precision of
police counter terrorism investigations.6 However, this overlooks
several important differences between general crime investiga-
tions and counter terrorism ones. Most significantly, counter-
terrorism investigations routinely invoke arrests pre-emptively to
disrupt a potential harm from occurring.
In this regard, trying to evaluate and assess the actual efficacy
of Prevent, within a continual swirl of critique and concern, is
bedeviled by similar challenges that afflict all crime prevention
programs—how can you determine whether any intervention has
worked or not, given if it has, the harm won’t occur (Hughes
1998)? Overall, the available evidence is mixed, with some suc-
cesses in preventing plausible terrorist attacks, but equally some
failures in policy formulation and its delivery on the ground, and
in securing public legitimacy (Innes 2006; Lakhani 2012; Mythen
et al. 2013).
Prevent’s Policy Development
Some of these issues can be understood as legacies of the
response to Islamist extremism prior to the implementation of
the CONTEST strategy. Both Foley (2014) and Nesser (2014)
identify that initially the policy stance toward many extremists in
the United Kingdom was relatively tolerant, especially when com-
pared with countries such as France. An important operational
distinction being drawn between those individuals directly
engaged in violence and others advocating support for them.
Although this disposition has changed over the last decade, Foley
contends that the deep legacy of these norms and the judicial
6 http://news.sky.com/story/1603052/police-terror-tactics-radicalising-muslims
(accessed 10/12/15).
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culture in the UK may continue to resonate subtly in the turn
toward disruption mapped by this article.
Such concerns notwithstanding, Prevent and the CONTEST
strategy framework have been influential internationally. The lat-
ter has been largely adopted by the European Union. Prevent is
widely acknowledged as having been the principal influence upon
the Obama administration’s National Strategy for Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) issued in 2011 (McCants & Watts 2012;
White House 2011). In a recent assessment of the police delivery
of CVE, Schanzer et al. (2016) identify that in its North American
incarnation, similar challenges and constraints are being encoun-
tered, as have been identified with Prevent. While carefully
cataloguing the limitations, the authors also identify more prom-
ising practices, such as separating the “outreach” and engage-
ment functions of local policing from intelligence gathering, and
ensuring that any such work is not just targeted at one specific
community. In sum though, and replicating much of the extant
research literature, much of what is described is concerned with
establishing platforms for building community trust, as opposed
to interventions designed to directly interfere with the activities
of suspected violent extremists. It is the latter aspect that is the
principal focus of the analysis reported below.
In practical delivery terms, Prevent encompasses a range of
activities, including: community engagement to develop commu-
nity intelligence; the aforementioned pre-criminal Channel de-
radicalization program; as well as the varieties of disruption
described herein. Broadly speaking, these diverse practices
gravitate around three principal challenges: the “counter-
radicalization” strand of Prevent focuses upon reducing exposure
to extremist ideas, narratives and contacts, especially where indi-
viduals and groups are adjudged to be vulnerable to being influ-
enced by these; de-radicalization activities seek to neutralize the
impact of extremist ideas and social contacts where individuals
and groups have been exposed to them, and encourage them to
disengage with those that function as ideological “hosts”; manag-
ing community cohesion/tensions was initially a key focus for Pre-
vent, although following an official review in 2011, issues of
integration and cohesion were formally separated out and
assigned to the Department for Communities and Local Govern-
ment (H.M. Government 2011). That said, local Prevent practi-
tioners have retained an interest in managing community
tensions and allied problems such as Islamaphobic hate crime.
Over time, the balance between these activities and interven-
tions shifted, as the Prevent strategy underwent four main revi-
sions. In its original iteration, Prevent was pretty much, what the
head of the Prevent Delivery Unit described as an “empty box,”
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lacking a defined methodology and objectives. A number of
police interviewees were candid about the challenges of imple-
menting Prevent in the early days. In their view, little thought
appeared to have been given by the policy designers to how it
would translate into practical actions on the ground. As a conse-
quence, much initial delivery of Prevent was improvised, devoid
of any defined template. As one Prevent officer recalled of his
introduction to his new role:
. . .we were then tasked to deal with people who fell out of
that operation and that has been problematic in that we have
had no specific training for carrying out that intervention.
How do you go to somebody who’s believed to be involved in
a group. . .and say to them ‘what grievance have you got,
what are your worries, talk to us’ when they already possibly,
are well down the path of radicalisation? So how do we get
trained into that? How do we manage that process and how
do we deal with that? (Police 2611-12)
This is consistent with O’Toole et al.’s (2016) interviews with
policy actors from this period, who likewise acknowledged a lack
of practical definition. Significantly, the authors note that Prevent
has routinely experienced a “loose-coupling” between central
government policy intent, and practical delivery in communities.
This has manifested in the marked divergences in approach
between government departments toward Prevent measures
(especially the Home Office and the Department for Communi-
ties and Local Government), and the varied local approaches to
implementing key processes and systems seen in different areas.
Similar variances and tensions can be observed among police
and security practitioners. Many studies refer to the counter-
terrorism apparatus of the state and the police when discussing
counter terrorism work, and in so doing imply the presence of a
tightly defined and agreed mission. In reality, the situation is fre-
quently more complex. This was clearly illuminated by statements
and press briefings issued following the conviction of Anjem
Choudary, leader of Al-Muhajiroun, in July 2016. An unnamed
police source suggested to journalists that the Security Service
had preferred not to prosecute Choudary in order to surveil and
collect intelligence on his acolytes and those being newly radical-
ized by his network. In tension with which, the police had been
seeking to mount a criminal prosecution as a mechanism to dis-
rupt Al-Muhajiroun’s influence.7 This is redolent of Steven and
7 http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/702521/MI5-Scotland-Yard-Anjem-Choudary-
ISIS-Islamic-State-terror-police-MI5-Scotland-Yard (accessed 24/08/16).
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Gunaratna’s (2004) analysis that Western liberal counter-
terrorism strategies typically blend intelligence-led, military, and
criminal justice dimensions. Being attentive to these tensions and
nuances, is vital to understanding how and why counter-
terrorism work is organized and ordered in particular ways.
“Prevent 2” as it was sometimes labelled, blended “primary”
and “secondary” crime prevention approaches, with significant
amounts of money channeled via a plethora of civil society
groups to deliver an array of interventions (Lakhani 2013).
Unsurprisingly, this profligate approach, which remained poorly
defined in terms of its theory of change and pathways to
impacting upon the problem, attracted considerable public and
political opprobrium. Some of the police interviewed who had
been involved in Prevent delivery during this time recalled
how:
This became the opportunity to take all of your frustrations
and your anger and the vitriol and the things that have been
pent up for a long, long-time. That was undoubtedly chal-
lenging for the officers. . . (Police 2659-24)
It was this version of Prevent that acquired a taint from which
it has never really recovered. For many in the UK’s Muslim com-
munities, Prevent had become a “toxic brand” (Innes et al. 2010).
With a change in government, a third version of Prevent was
introduced by the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition
administration in 2011. This shifted the policy accent from civil
society and community group led delivery, to placing primacy
upon public services, including local councils, schools, colleges
and universities, and health providers. The fourth and most
recent version of Prevent was introduced in 2015, instigating a
controversial move toward countering extremism and not just
violent extremism (H.M. Government 2015). A discourse of Pre-
vent interventions being used to “safeguard” individuals at risk of
radicalization has also become far more prominent.
These adaptations are, in part, a function of shifting political
power. But they also signal that Prevent is perceived as struggling
to adequately “grip” and establish traction upon the morphing lit-
any of risks and threats it was designed to engage with. The pre-
eminent threat has shifted from an Al-Qaeda inspired network of
networks, to activities associated with and drawing ideological
succor from the so called Islamic State (Burke 2015). Concomi-
tantly, the threat profile has altered to include simultaneous risks
of highly organized spectacular “set piece” attacks, alongside
more “organic” lone actors inspired by, but only loosely con-
nected to any formal group structures (Gill & Corner 2013;
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Nesser 2014). At the same time, the case of Anders Breivik in
Norway served as a reminder that there is a political spectrum of
terrorist threats, and what matters most is an extreme set of ideas
and access to weapons. These processes of simultaneous diversifi-
cation and simplification, have served to reframe key elements of
the prevailing threat assessment and the challenges it presents to
counter terrorism agencies. Possible assailants are less sophisticat-
ed in terms of their attack skills, but there are potentially more
of them. After all, publicly beheading a victim is principally a
problem of motivation and will, rather than planning and
equipment.
Despite these developments and all the effort that has gone
into this area of work, the performance metrics are difficult to
interpret. In addition to the massive expansion of referrals into
the Channel Program8, official estimates suggest that around 700
people have traveled from the UK to Syria, many of whom were
not “on the radar” of the police or security service. The UK
Counter-Terrorism network estimates they are taking down
around 1000 Web sites a week linked to jihadist propaganda, but
these are rapidly replaced. The Commissioner of the Metropoli-
tan Police has stated that over the past year six credible plots
were disrupted, where a few years ago they were dealing with
one maybe two per annum. Since 2010, over 140 individuals
have been convicted in the UK courts of terrorism related offen-
ces, and in 2014 there were 327 arrests, up 32 percent on the
previous year. The Director General of the Security Service stated
in the latter months of 2015 that in excess of 3000 individuals
were subject to active monitoring, up from the figure of 1600 giv-
en by his predecessor in 2006.9 As elaborated below, it is this
scale and “pace” of activity that is a key factor in accounting for
why disruption has come to play such an important role in the
counter terrorism apparatus.
But while sharp criticisms of Prevent continue to be voiced,
viable practical alternatives are rarely articulated. Although we
are developing a better understanding of how some people can
be induced and influenced to adopt a more extreme political
position, the most effective means to inoculate them from these
influences and interdict those who propagate them is proving far
harder to establish (English 2014).
8 See www.npcc.police.uk/FreedomofInformation/NationalChannelReferralFigures
(accessed 06/12/15).
9 Manningham-Buller, E. (2006) “The International Terrorist Threat to the UK”, a
speech to QueenMary’s College London (09/11/06) https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/the-inter-
national-terrorist-threat-to-the-uk (accessed 06/05/16).
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Defining Disruption: Strategy or Tactic
The serial reconfigurations of Prevent outlined above have
seen the notion of disrupting extremist and terrorist networks
become increasingly prominent and salient. However, what has
not been unpicked within these developments is how there are in
fact two rather different concepts and understandings of disrup-
tion in play. One casts disruption as a strategic approach. The
second defines it more as a specific set of tactical interventions.
The former approach is exemplified by the UK Government’s
recently published “Counter-Extremism Strategy” where, in their
respective forwards, both the former Prime Minister and Home
Secretary accent the significance of disruption. The then Prime
Minister asserting: “We will disrupt extremists, aggressively pur-
suing the key radical users who do so much damage” (H.M. Gov-
ernment 2015: 6). The crucial point here is how disruption is
being centered as an over-arching strategy.
This rhetorical re-positioning was explicitly echoed by the
Home Secretary: “We will disrupt all those who seek to spread
hate and we will prosecute all those who break the law” (H.M.
Government 2015: 7). Here disruption has been cast as an equal
partner to the more orthodox criminal justice objective of prose-
cuting those who contravene the law. Reflecting this, the same
policy document sets out how delivery of Counter-Extremism
work will be organized around four key areas, one of which is
wholly focused upon a logic of disruption: Countering extremist
ideology; Building a partnership with all those opposed to
extremism; Disrupting extremists; and Building more cohesive
communities.
Understanding disruption as a strategic orientation to tack-
ling extremism and terrorism is also the approach adopted by
Bjorgo (2015). He identifies how the prevention of terrorist
attacks is frequently predicated upon the implementation of a
range of interventions intended to disrupt the operations of indi-
viduals, groups and networks. These can include the arrest of
subjects of interest and the imposition of legal sanctions, through
to extra-legal forms of overt surveillance and target hardening.
This “broad” conceptualization of disruption as a strategic
endeavor contrasts with a second “narrower” position that under-
stands it more as a defined tactic. This more operational con-
struct has a long history in the policing of serious and organized
crime, and is associated with the doctrine of intelligence-led polic-
ing. In his account of the art and craft of detective work, Hobbs
(1989) discusses some of the creative and innovative ways that
officers sought to subdue and circumscribe the activities of their
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criminal adversaries. This is consistent with Johnston’s (2000: 61)
definition that: “The rationale [of disruption] is to circumvent the
formal justice system in order, more easily, to affect the speedy
closure of a given problem.” In their empirical exploration of dis-
ruption within intelligence-led policing systems, Innes and Shep-
tycki (2004) find two principal forms. There is a “legal
entrepreneur” mode wherein innovative tactics are used to
mount a prosecution against an individual or a network for offen-
ces other than those they were principally being investigated for.
This is distinct from disruptions performed by police because
they cannot secure evidence to legitimate a prosecution, and con-
sequently seek to interfere with the operations of the criminal
enterprise—what Innes and Sheptycki (2004) label “extra-legal
disruptions.” In both modes, disruption seeks behavioral
influencing. It is implemented to try and modify and amend the
conduct of particular individuals, to reduce some perceived risk.
While disruption has had a long-standing presence in the
policing of organized crime, the effectiveness of the two principal
formations identified above have not been robustly evaluated.
One recent study picking up on the significance of disruption in
counter terrorism work is Sentas’ (2016) analysis of the Security
Service’s interactions with a small number of Kurdish residents
living in London. The account provided is insightful in assessing
the disruptive effects upon social identity flowing out of the inter-
actions, but quite limited in other respects. Most notably, the
focus is solely upon how the legal power of proscription is enlist-
ed as a disruptive technology, to engage processes of criminaliza-
tion in respect of legitimate political protest. However, as
intimated in the preceding paragraph and developed below, pro-
scription is not the only way in which disruptive effects upon
extremist adversaries are sought by police. Accordingly, there is a
danger of over-generalizing from Sentas’ focused case study, and
failing to appreciate how disruption involves an increasingly het-
erogeneous collection of behavior influencing and management
practices.
This is especially pertinent for thinking about the relationship
between short-term and longer-term impacts. For what the limit-
ed literature on the use of disruption to counter organized crime
suggests is that police disrupt when they doubt a prosecution will
be a viable investigative outcome. In the context of countering
violent and nonviolent extremism, the intent is often not to dis-
mantle any such networks, or to change peoples’ fundamental
motivations; that is seen as too difficult to do at any scale. Rather,
the more prosaic aim is to keep individuals and groups of con-
cern sufficiently “off balance” by disrupting them, that they can-
not be effective, at least for the time being. What is not known
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because of the lack of long-term rigorous research, is whether,
because these are ideologically motivated rather than more
opportunist actors, disrupting them simply pushes the problem
“downstream,” where it will resurface again at a later date. This
is because the individuals concerned retain a commitment to the
ideas and motivations underpinning the acts that were disrupted.
Kenney et al.’s (2016) analysis of how the Al-Muhajiroun network
learned and adapted subsequent to being proscribed by the UK
authorities certainly intimates that this may be the case.
Doing Disruption
Teasing out these two distinctive conceptualizations of disrup-
tion, that are in tension with each other, helps to identify the tra-
jectory of development associated with this idea and how, as it
has been integrated into counter terrorism practice, it is in the
process of being shifted from referring to a specific type of polic-
ing intervention, to become freighted with a more strategic load.
That is, in terms of how counter terrorism policy is being
designed, and its implementation conceived, disruption oriented
actions are understood as performing more and more of the
work of countering and mitigating key risks and threats. In the
remainder of this article however, we prefer to use it in its origi-
nal more “tactical” formulation to refer to specific forms of
intervention.
During the interviews with police Prevent practitioners many
accounts of using disruption were provided. For example, one
respondent told how:
Another Mosque rang up one of my sergeants and said we’ve
got three guys coming here, and they were doing the proper
radicalization thing. They were trying to draw kids in, they
were trying to have little meetings, they were being quite rad-
ical. ‘We’d appreciate your support if you could come and
help us, and speak to these three individuals because we
don’t want them here but we’re a little bit concerned.’ So
[Name]’s gone down, confronted the three individuals: ‘The
Mosque don’t want you here, what are you about? Do you
want to talk to me about it?’ They didn’t. They went. We
know where they went.
The police Inspector recounted how his team undertook to
raise awareness locally about the individuals concerned, in order
that others might further disrupt the group’s activities. As a
result, there was a sequence of locally generated “extra-legal”
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disruptions enacted that inhibited them settling in any new
premises:
It’s a disruption in a way. . .[Officer name] said we know who
you are, we know what you’re doing, we will not tolerate
what you’re doing, you’d better start thinking about it. Be
clear, we are watching you. Now that is an intervention and
that’s a Prevent intervention. (2611-11)
In this sequence, police clearly indicated to their “persons of
interest” that they were subject to police surveillance and possibly
more assertive interventions if they continued with their activity. As
evidenced by this example, disruption is a tactic favored by Prevent
officers for managing behaviors that are “anti-social” and indirectly
increase a threat, but do not involve an obvious infraction of law. At
the same time, there is also a hint of the limitations of disrupting
committed extremists. For with his comment “They went. We know
where they went.”, the Inspector acknowledges the problem was
not really “solved.” Rather, the individuals concerned moved on to
another area. This is significant inasmuch as while disruptions
might provide short-term and local “fixes” to countering particular
extremist groups, we cannot yet evaluate whether displacing and
disturbing extremist activities is effective over the longer term.
Potentially however, this might also indicate that a desired police
outcome of implementing disruptions is to impact upon the
“efficiency” of their adversaries by creating a “hostile environment”
where it is more difficult for them to operate, and increased effort
has to be expended to undertake their desired activities.
Attending to such considerations is important both in terms
of starting to lay out some of the complexities that inhere in these
forms of counter terrorism work, but also in understanding why
disruption is valued by police. According to officers spoken to
during this research, many of the subjects of interest to the police
are highly surveillance aware, managing their conduct carefully
to avoid transgressing any laws that might expose them to a crim-
inal prosecution. Indeed, in one interaction between Prevent
engagement officers and a person of interest that was observed,
the police started making enquiries of the individual and what he
had been up to. The response to their questions was a detailed
exposition about a specific point of law relating to the interaction,
and the subject handing them a card providing details of their
legal representative’s name and contact details. At which point
the interaction ended.
Being able to act relatively quickly, and to avoid the intricate,
complex, time-consuming, and resource-intensive work associated
with developing and converting intelligence into evidence to
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build a case and support a legal prosecution was clearly an
important factor in the police’s use of disruption. The key issues
from a police perspective were summarized as follows by an offi-
cer involved in the delivery of Prevent, reflecting upon the 2005
London bombings:
There was a three month window of opportunity before Sadiq
Khan and his comrades committed the attack. . .The reason
why the service said they weren’t pursuing them was because
they weren’t high enough on the intel radar. However, why
didn’t we just send a couple of uniformed officers to knock
on the door and say “Hi Mohammed, I’m from the counter-
terrorism unit, we really need to have a chat.”. . .They’ve no
idea what level of detail we know, very, very powerful that.
[Police 2659-24]10
As this suggests, in practice there is frequently a tension
between having intelligence-led suspicions about the involvement
of particular individuals and securing sufficient evidence to war-
rant commencement of legal proceedings. Confronted by such
challenges, recourse to disruption becomes an attractive and via-
ble option for intervention from a police point of view. Accord-
ingly, the majority of officers saw disruption as constituting an
increasingly important aspect of their work.
Community-Led Disruptions
The preceding discussion has focused upon disruption as a
tactic utilized by formal agents of social control. However, looking
across the interview data, it was equally clear that there were a
number of cases of “community led disruptions,” which also
appear to have been impactive in terms of inhibiting and under-
mining the activities of groups adjudged to be involved in
extremist radicalization activities. The application of informal
community social control capacities to disrupt extremist groups
can be more, or less, connected to and co-ordinated with police
actions. The empirical data informing this study identified both
“co-produced” and more independent community-led disrup-
tions. The latter form is especially important though, given evi-
dence from other studies suggesting that, although some people
are so disenchanted with Prevent they are disengaging from any
involvement with the formal government schemes or funding,
10 Of course the efficacy of any such intervention may be limited inasmuch as it may
not prevent the progression to violence on its own, but it may provide an opportunity for
further dialogue between the police and the individual(s) and the possibility of engaging
them in additional Prevent activities.
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they are still involved in efforts against extremist groups outside
of these systems and processes (O’Toole et al. 2016).
One interviewee described how, while members of an extrem-
ist group were setting up a stall with a loudspeaker and leaflets
in the local high street, members of the local Muslim community
opposed to their ideological stance decided to dynamically dis-
rupt this activity. Several of them ran past the stall taking the
equipment that was being laid out and ran off with it. A second
interviewee recalled occasions where:
One of our friends, you know, him and his wife, I mean I’ll
just describe him to you, he’s got a big beard, his wife wears
the whole hijab and everything, they came round and his
wife just told him in so many words to go and get stuffed,
get out of here, we don’t need your type. So they put a lot of
pressure, so the community put a lot of pressure on him, so
he sort of diluted the whole thing that he was doing. And
then the other thing we did was we set up a council of Mosques,
so all the Mosques in the area, we got them all together round a
table and to have a clear consensus that we don’t want this guy in
the area, we’ll go and speak to him and get him kicked out,
because we do not want him. (Community 265)
This “collectivizing” of the problem and the setting up of a
network of individuals and associated organizations provided the
backdrop for subsequent developments. In particular, having
found that they were no longer welcome at the local Mosques,
the leader and his group started renting local meeting rooms for
events to which they would invite young people from the local
area. The police identified this was happening and shared their
concerns with the local community, at which point there was a
collective deliberation about what to do next:
The community was saying we are going to ‘front’ this guy
and our line was we’ll support you. Because by that time we
had explored the prosecution option and there was nothing
really on the table. (Police 451)
The latter comment is especially intriguing, for it signals how
police were unsure how to proceed against individuals engaging
in activities that while certainly undesirable, were not illegal.11
11 The subjects of these interventions were alleged members of the legally proscribed
group Al-Muhajiroun, more details on the background and history of which are set out by
Wiktorowicz (2005), Nesser (2014) and Kenney et al. (2016). These accounts document how
members of Al-Muhajiroun and the network of affiliates and aliases it has established, fre-
quently operate at the threshold of legal regulation, while expressing extreme and challeng-
ing opinions.
Innes, Roberts, & Lowe 271
They were especially concerned about initiating enforcement
actions that were unlikely to be successful. Police trepidation was
amplified by a worry that their opponents would exploit any
such developments for propaganda value and officers were con-
cerned not to give them the oxygen of publicity. At this point the
community group assumed “ownership” of the problem, phoning
all the local venues where bookings had been made, informing
the owners about the real names of the group who had made the
bookings under false identities, and expressing their displeasure
at their local presence. As a consequence, all the bookings were
cancelled and the proselytizers’ activities disrupted.
It is interesting to counter-pose this case, with the one out-
lined at the start of this article. For the former involved a situa-
tion where community concerns led to a police-led disruption.
Contrastingly, the events discussed above, were based upon police
identified concerns, but it was informal social control by the local
community group that disrupted the activities. Documenting
both of these modes of disruption, as well as those wholly inde-
pendent of formal Prevent structures, is important in capturing
some of the complexities and nuances associated with the practi-
cal delivery of Prevent interventions “on the ground” these days.
Doing so foregrounds how these developments are coherent with
wider and deeper trends in the conduct of social control associat-
ed with a blending of the auspices of formal and informal social
control (see Carr 2006; Roussell & Gascon 2014).
The accounts above all reference interventions targeted at
extremists seeking to disseminate and indoctrinate others with
their ideologies. There were however, a small number of instan-
ces identified in the fieldwork, where disruptive interventions
were steered toward those seen as potentially vulnerable to these
overtures, or to becoming involved in conflict. This approach was
clearly evident where the local Muslim community mobilized
their resources in response to a planned Welsh Defence League
march. Fearing the potential for a confrontation between their
young people and the Far-Right supporters, one community
worker described how local civil society and faith groups:
Put on events to keep the young people away. Mainly, just for
you know worrying about our young people getting involved
and getting arrested. . .In the local park we had a football
tournament, we had BBQ. . .and family fun day. So it’s basical-
ly trying to get the whole community out. . .we had over 100
people turn up that day. (Community K)
Scheduled to run at the same time as the protest marches,
the activities were deliberately designed to appeal to the local
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youths; thereby distracting their attention away from the other
events that day. This represents a specifically counter terrorism
inflected example of a familiar pattern from crime prevention
more generally, where diversionary activities are routinely imple-
mented in support of preemptive crime risk reduction efforts
(Bjorgo 2015).
The Practical Ethics of Prevent and Pursue
The preceding sections have documented a range of practices
and logics being used to disrupt individuals and groups propa-
gating extremist ideologies that might radicalize others, as well as
those posing a risk of engaging in terrorism related crimes. A sit-
uation where police are deciding that certain individuals and
ethno-political groups should be subject to surveillance and cen-
suring actions, absent any independent oversight or adversarial
judicial “testing” of the evidence for this, is obviously replete with
potential ethical concerns. This is particularly so, given the gov-
ernmental policy imperative has increasingly pushed for “earlier
intervention” and the need to tackle “extreme ideologies,” rather
than just activities directly connected to the commission of
violence.
Such concerns resonate with issues in the ethics of crime pre-
vention more generally. Any interventions premised upon predic-
tion, pre-emption, and prevention pose challenging ethical
questions about: “how far ‘upstream’ from the harm being coun-
tered it is viable and/or appropriate to go?”; “how strong the
causal links between the point of intervention and the problem to
be prevented needs to be?”; and, “how discriminating any inter-
vention should be in respect of targeting ‘at risk’ groups versus
individuals?” (von Hirsch Garland & Wakefield 2000). In respect
of the police function, and the increasing predilection for proac-
tive strategies that seek to prevent rather than just react to inci-
dents, repeated concerns have been expressed about the efficacy
of governance and regulation processes (Uglow 1988); especially
since front-line police officers possess considerable discretion in
deciding how, when and against whom their legal powers are
expressed (Skolnick 1966).
One key limitation of many previous commentaries on Pre-
vent has been a tendency to view it in isolation, neglecting how it
articulates with the other strands of the CONTEST strategy. This
is a significant oversight as Prevent led disruptions can sometimes
offer an alternative course of intervention to more coercive and
“covert” Pursue tactics. Illustrating this, one officer recalled his
decisionmaking in respect of a situation he was confronted with:
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We’ve got a gym, but it’s also a school, it’s one of these multi-
user buildings. . .and there’s some suggestion that at some
point radicalisation may have occurred. . .There’s some other
reporting that’s a little more specific. . .Now I’ve looked at that
and thought what do I do? Do I send a UC (undercover) in?
Do I try and recruit an informant? And I thought actually I’ll
just go and see them and wandered in and the chap that I met was
very compelling when I spoke to him. (Police 2659-03)
This account lays out some of the uncertainties and contin-
gencies that officers frequently encounter in their Prevent work.
Concerns about risks of people being radicalized are often based
upon rumors, suspicions and “soft” rather than “hard facts.”
Viewed in this way, more overt Prevent based interventions may
afford an opportunity to deal with concerns in ways precluding
the need to resort to more intrusive, covert or coercive measures.
But as with any “risk” based management system, there are always
problems with “false positives” and “false negatives” in terms of tar-
geting individuals and groups who should not have been identified
as “risky,” andmissing others who should have been.
The more assertive and explicitly enforcement oriented
aspects of police Pursue operations frequently shape and influ-
ence the context in which Prevent is delivered. Foregrounding
some of these strategic interactions, one of the community
respondents described the community impacts associated with the
nationally high profile “Operation Gamble”:
All of a sudden you find that there’s people in your midst
who may have been up to no good. You’ve got the whole of
the media, you’ve got a house being raided with ten police
vans and 50 fluorescent jackets and the raid’s done. . .and all
life kind of stops because you’ve got all this media attention
and everyone in the community is affected by it. . .. (Community
2654-01)
Counter-pointed with these kinds of local community conse-
quences in the aftermath of major police counter terrorism oper-
ations, disruptive interventions may provide a more subtle way of
tackling an issue. One that, because it is less high profile, might
limit the stigmatization and labelling of a particular area and its
residents, thereby, at least hypothetically, minimizing the commu-
nity impacts felt in the aftermath of a policing action.
Discussion: Legal Cynicism and Legal Entrepreneurship
Prevent and its associated practices of disruption are “pre-
crime” interventions coherent with and constitutive of the
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broader precautionary imperative identified by Zedner (2007) in
terms of a policy paradigm shift toward pre-empting harms. Ash-
worth and Zedner (2014) describe how criminal law has adopted
several offence types embodying this precautionary stance
(including, and of particular relevance in counter terrorism legis-
lation: preparatory, possession and membership offences). Along-
side which there are several “restraining principles” that guide
and frame the circumstances and conditions under which such
offences can be applied—including “remoteness”—understood as
the distance and imputed causal links between the prohibited
conduct and harm-to-be-prevented. But while criminal law clearly
enables the conduct of disruption to prevent harms associated
with violent extremism, police often resort to disruption to cir-
cumvent the challenges with operationalizing law to “solve” such
problems. Communities may similarly engage pre-crime disrup-
tions because of the perceived difficulties in working with police
and/or because of a view that legal provisions afford inadequate
levels of protection.
Disruptive interventions in counter terrorism work are some-
times channeled through defined legal instruments, such as pow-
ers of proscription or arrest for other offences, but can also
involve attempts to circumvent what officers perceive as con-
straining or inhibiting influences upon their conduct. From Skol-
nick’s (1966) pioneering analysis of discretion onwards, there has
been a recognition that the activity of policing is never just “law
enforcement,” but is a rather more intricate and nuanced affair.
As Dixon (1997) summarized, law in policing is simultaneously
constraining and enabling, seeking to limit some police behaviors
while encouraging others. Leo’s (2009) detailed account of police
interrogation procedures, for instance, describes officers deliber-
ately seek to “bend” and manipulate the provisions of legal con-
straints in their interactions with suspects. In his ethnographic
account of major crime investigations Innes (2003), building on
Hobbs (1989), offers the concept of “legal entrepreneurship” to
capture how creatively circumventing legal constraints on police
action, in ways not contravening key principles, was especially val-
ued by police investigators in their understandings of “the craft”
skills of detective work. In effect, while law was accepted as a reg-
ulatory influence on police decisionmaking and behavior, it was
equally understood by officers that there are “regulatory gray
zones” that could be negotiated and “stretched” in terms of what
was permissible. There are clear resonances here with the utiliza-
tion of disruptive interventions in countering violent extremism
described above. For what can be observed is officers innovatively
and creatively seeking ways to work around legal frameworks to
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try and manage risks and threats where legal provision is not
necessarily helpful.
One way of understanding police recourse to disruption to
manage violent extremism risks is as a unique inflection of legal
cynicism by police. The extensive literature on police culture
documents a long-standing set of norms and beliefs held by offi-
cers and propagated by their organizational culture that are simi-
lar, in some ways, to the tenor and tone of descriptions of legal
cynicism within neighborhoods. Writing in the 1980s, Smith and
Gray (1983) described police discriminating between: “working
rules” that were internalized practical guides to action; external
“inhibiting rules” that have a deterrent effect on their conduct;
and “presentation rules” used to give a publicly acceptable gloss
to what actually happens. More recently, in her ethnographic
study of front-line patrol officers, Loftus (2009) recorded how
many officers still expressed cynical views about the law and
criminal justice process on the grounds that it was balanced, in
their view, to favor the rights of suspects.
For officers engaged in countering violent extremism, submit-
ting all cases to the full criminal justice process was perceived as
untenable and requiring too great an investment of resources, set
against a backdrop where there are a larger number of risks to
be managed. As it stands, Home Office (2016) statistics show that
of the 3349 individuals in England and Wales arrested under ter-
rorist legislation since 2001, 28 percent were convicted in court,
albeit 10 percent of these involved lesser, nonterrorism offences.
Mounting disruptions is a pragmatic way of managing large and
complex case-loads, especially for those circumstances where it is
thought likely that the provisions available in law may not be ade-
quate for accomplishing a desired outcome. Positioned in this
way, recourse to disruption in delivering Prevent policing appears
as a manifestation of a blend of legal cynicism and entrepreneur-
ialism. It reflects the skepticism officers feel about the extent to
which law covers all of the complex issues encountered when
dealing with individuals holding and propagating extremist view-
points. At the same time though, disruption involves them crea-
tively doing something in respect of issues that although of
concern, are not necessarily priorities when positioned alongside
other risks.
Conclusion: The “Disruptive Turn”
This article has located a distinct “disruptive turn” in UK
counter terrorism policy and practice. Conducting interventions
designed explicitly to disrupt individuals, groups and networks
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who are suspected of extremist or terrorist affiliations, has
become a more pronounced feature of counter terrorism work.
These interventions are not being performed in pursuit of prose-
cutions or police detections, but rather to inhibit and interfere
with the ability of suspected adversaries to operate effectively and
efficiently.
This turn toward disruption, conceptualized as a particular
formulation of preventative behavior influencing, is the product
of three principal causes. First, the challenges of managing a spe-
cies of public problem involving individuals and groups whose
intrinsic motivations toward engaging in violent criminal activity are
not opportunistic, but strongly ideological. The second causal factor
relates to how disruption affords a pragmatic way of reconciling
issues of supply and demand across the policing and security agen-
cies. It is a way of doing something, at least over the short-term,
about risks and threats that are potentially troublesome but cannot
be prioritized given the resource intensive requirements of mount-
ing full investigations to support a prosecution. Finally, the disrup-
tive turn also reflects some of the complexities deriving from how
many counter terrorism investigations are initiated on the basis of
secret intelligence from both digital and human sources that is
passed to the police by the Security Service, and the difficulties that
inhere in translating this material into evidence that will function in
an adversarial legal setting. In this sense, disruption can be under-
stood as a flawed but necessary policing response.
The notion of there being a disruptive turn is clearly coher-
ent with recent academic studies that have found contemporary
counter terrorism is being steered and guided by an underpin-
ning logic of prediction and pre-emption (Ashworth & Zedner
2014; Mythen & Walklate 2013). What the focus upon disruption
affords though is a more precise depiction of how this pre-
emptive work is being performed by police and their partners.
The majority of counter terrorism investigations are conducted
to try and stop particular kinds of harm from being enacted. Dis-
ruption provides a mode of intervention for acting in circumstan-
ces where securing evidence to support a prosecution is
perceived as difficult, or where resource constraints do not per-
mit a full investigation to be conducted. Undoubtedly, this raises
important ethical concerns about the scrutiny and accountability
of such modalities of social control.
Over the past 10 years high profile police counter terrorism
actions have become a regular part of the news cycle. In contrast
to these instances of “shock and awe policing,” this article has
attended to some of the more mundane and routine behavior
management strategies of police counter terrorism work. A blend
of interventions designed to divert and disrupt are now a staple
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ingredient of the delivery of the Prevent strand of the cross-
governmental CONTEST strategy.
The principal proposition set out in this article is that Prevent
counter terrorism policing actions increasingly seek behavioral
disruption, conceptualized as both a method of intervening and a
desired policy intent. This arc of development has inflected offi-
cial discourses and rhetorics associated with Prevent, and
counter-extremism and radicalization work more generally.
Equally however, it points to the need for research in this area to
accurately document and describe how Prevent and associated
aspects of counter terrorism are actually being performed. For
while there have been empirical studies of Prevent, most of these
have been concerned with community and social reactions to
aspects of the discourse and policy framing. Far less attention has
focused upon describing the specific details of the counter-
terrorism work performed and how it is enacted in particular sit-
uations and settings. It is to this gap in our knowledge that the
current article has attended.
More generally, the research literature on crime prevention
identifies a spectrum of preventative activities, from “early inter-
ventions” seeking to interfere in causal processes “upstream,”
through to others designed to work far closer to the crime event.
The empirical data reported herein clarifies that, in the context
of preventing violent extremism, disruptions occupy a distinctive
space. They function as “near event” interdictions, in that, for all
the instances documented in this article, the issues of concern
were already well underway. Indeed, the defining quality of dis-
ruption is that many of the predicate conditions for a presenting
problem are in place, but disrupting it mitigates and minimizes
associated impacts and harms. Understood in this way, this analy-
sis helps to define disruption’s unique conceptual position as an
important modality of contemporary crime prevention.
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